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STATE v. PARKER: SEARCHING THE BELONGINGS OF
NONARRESTED VEHICLE PASSENGERS DURING A
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
H. Matthew Munson
Abstract: The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution generally require a warrant supported by probable cause to conduct
a search or seizure. One exception to these requirements is a search incident to arrest, which
permits the police to search arrested persons and the area within the arrestee's reach for
weapons and evidence. Prior to State v. Parker, when police arrested an occupant of an
automobile in Washington, they could search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle
with the exception of locked containers. In State v. Parker,a plurality of the Supreme Court
of Washington declared that during the search of an automobile incident to arrest police may
not search the belongings of individuals who are not arrested, The Parkerplurality would not
permit police to search a container they know or should know is owned by a nonarrested
individual unless they have reasonable suspicion that the container holds a weapon or
evidence of crime. This Note argues that the Parkerplurality deviates from state and federal
precedent by (1) using ownership instead of access to immunize items from search, (2)
concluding that vehicle passengers have an increased level of privacy protection under the
Washington Constitution, and (3) characterizing a search incident to arrest as a Terry search.
This Note concludes that the plurality's failure to follow precedent and inability to formulate a
clear majority rule will confuse lower courts and endanger officers by preventing them from
searching any item in a car that may contain a weapon.

In 1997, a Washington State Patrol trooper stopped a car' for speeding
and arrested the driver for operating a vehicle with a revoked driver's
license.2 The trooper removed the driver from the car, handcuffed him,
and placed him in the patrol car.3 Before releasing the vehicle to Deborah
Lee Parker, the only passenger, the trooper noticed an open beer can
between the two front seats. Concerned Parker might be intoxicated, the
trooper asked Parker to exit the car for a blood-alcohol test.4 Parker left
her open purse on the passenger seat.5 As part of his search of the
passenger compartment, the trooper searched the purse and found a bag
of methamphetamine in a coin purse.6 The State charged Parker with
1. Following the practice of federal and state courts, this Note will use "automobile," "car," and
"vehicle" interchangeably. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455, 459, 462 (1981); State
v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 147, 150, 720 P.2d 436,438, 440 (1986).
2. See State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486,489, 987 P.2d 73, 76 (1999).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 490, 987 P.2d at 76.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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possession of a controlled substance.' In a motion to suppress the drugs,
Parker claimed that the police had violated her constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure.8
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution9 and Article I,
Section 7 of the Washington Constitution"0 protect the privacy of
individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally,
both constitutions require that searches be conducted with a warrant and
probable cause," but courts recognize certain exceptions where a search
is reasonable.' 2 One such exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements is the search incident to arrest: when law enforcement
officers make arrests, police may search arrestees 3 and the area within
arrestees' immediate control 4 to secure weapons and evidence. Before
last year, when arresting a person in an automobile, police could search
the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle, including containers, 5
with the exception, in Washington, of locked containers. 6
In State v. Parker,7 a plurality of the Supreme Court of Washington
stated that during vehicle searches incident to the arrest of an occupant,
police may not search a container owned by a non-arrested vehicle
occupant if the officer knows or should know that the container is owned
7. See id.
8. See id. at 492, 987 P.2d at 77.
9. The federal Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
10. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." Wash. Const. art. I, § 7.
11. Probable cause exists "where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a
man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found."
Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76(1949)).
12. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-16 (1972).
13. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220-23 (1973); State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d
675, 680, 835 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1992).
14. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
15. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (198 1).
16. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986).
17. 139 Wash. 2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999).
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by that person. 8 The plurality noted that persons retain privacy rights
when in vehicles 9 and that protection of the person may extend to
personal effects, such as purses.2" Law enforcement's interest in securing
weapons and evidence did not overcome Parker's privacy interest in her
purse.2' In a concurring opinion, Justice Talmadge argued that only very
small containers incapable of holding weapons should be immune from
search.22 Justice Alexander, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
would have limited the rule to restricting police from searching any
container they know belongs to vehicle occupants who are not arrested. 23
This Note argues that the Parker plurality's rule deviates from state
and federal precedent, endangers officers, and impedes effective law
enforcement. Part I provides a survey of the search-and-seizure law
necessary to understand Parker,with an emphasis on the search-incidentto-arrest exception under the U.S. and Washington constitutions. Part II
summarizes the facts and opinions of Parker.Part III gives an overview
of the treatment and meaning of plurality decisions so that Parker's
status as precedent may be better understood. Part IV argues that the
Parker plurality's deviation from Washington precedent threatens the
safety of police officers and the efficacy of law enforcement.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section
7 of the Washington Constitution generally protect the security of
citizens in their persons and property. 24 The protection is not, however,
absolute under either constitution. In determining the contours of the
constitutional protections, courts weigh the desire to be free from
governmental intrusion against the interest in safe and effective law
18. See id. at 505, 987 P.2d at 84 (plurality opinion). Justice Johnson was joined by Justices
Smith, Madsen, and Sanders. See id.

19. See id. at 494-98, 987 P.2d at 78-80 (plurality opinion).
20. See id. at 496-99, 987 P.2d at 80-81 (plurality opinion).
21. See id. at 499, 987 P.2d at 81 (plurality opinion).
22. See id. at 516-17, 987 P.2d at 90 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 517-18, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510,
688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984) (recognizing that Art. I, § 7 protects against State intrusion into
defendant's private affairs).
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enforcement." Courts have recognized that under certain circumstances
the latter outweighs the former to such an extent that government action
not meeting normal constitutional requirements is reasonable. One of the
circumstances not subject to certain constitutional protections is the
search incident to arrest.
A.

Exceptions to the Warrant and ProbableCause Requirements of the
FourthAmendment Relevant to State v. Parker

The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures typically requires police to have probable cause and obtain
warrants before conducting searches or seizures.26 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, has recognized certain narrow exceptions where
governmental interests outweigh private interests.2 7 Of the exceptions to
the warrant and probable cause requirements, two are especially
important to understanding Parker: stops and frisks pursuant to Terry v.
Ohio28 and searches incident to arrest.
1.

Terry Allowed Stop-And-FriskSearches To Protect Officer Safety
and PermitEffective Law Enforcement

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, a law
enforcement officer may stop a person and conduct a limited search for
weapons if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed
and dangerous.29 Terry searches must "last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop,"3 entail only a frisk for weapons,3
and require suspicion of each person searched.32 Importantly, Terry
searches require neither a warrant nor probable cause to believe a person
25. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
27. Although the Fourth Amendment protects a variety of private interests, see. e.g., United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (possessory interest) and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
585 n.24 (1980) (liberty interest), the interest it is most often said to protect is the reasonable
expectation of privacy. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28.
29.
30.
31.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id.
at 27.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26.

32. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94.
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has committed a crime.33 Rather, a police officer must have a reasonable
suspicion that "his safety or that of others [is] in danger."34 The Court in
Teny recognized two government interests in permitting such an
exception to the Fourth Amendment: effective law enforcement and
officer safety.3 5 These governmental interests outweighed individuals'
privacy interest in avoiding limited searches of their person.3 6
The police also may conduct a Teny search of a vehicle. In Michigan
v. Long,37 the U.S. Supreme Court held that officers may frisk a car for
weapons if they reasonably suspect that a passenger or a person near the
car is dangerous and that the passenger may grab a weapon from the
car. In so holding, the Court noted that "roadside encounters between
police and suspects," like Terry stops, are especially dangerous to
officers.3 9 The enhanced danger of the roadside encounter justifies police
frisking cars on less than probable cause.4"
2.

Without a Search Warrantor Probable Cause, Officers May
Conduct Searches Incident to Arrest ofAutomobiles' Passenger
Compartments and Containers

A long-recognized exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements, the search incident to arrest permits law enforcement
officers to search arrested persons and, to some extent, their
surroundings. 4' The search incident to arrest is designed to allow officers
to obtain evidence of the crime for which an arrest is made and to
prevent an arrested person's access to weapons or means of escape.42 The
search must occur at the time of the arrest or soon thereafter43 and it does
not require a warrant or probable cause to believe that a weapon or
33. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22,27.
34. Id at27.

35. See id. at 23.
36. See id. at 24-27.
37. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

38. See id. at 1049.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 1048-49.
41. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (noting that it has been "the right
on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the
person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime").

42. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
43. See United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 1987).
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evidence will be found, as long as there is probable cause for arrest.'
Whenever officers arrest a person, they may search that person,
regardless of the grounds for arrest."a
The scope of a search of houses46 incident to arrest, which mirrors in
some ways the search of vehicles incident to arrest, is limited. In Chimel
v. California,7 the U.S. Supreme Court confined the search of a house
where a person is arrested to the area within the arrestee's immediate
control, which meant those areas within his or her reach." The Chimel
Court emphasized officer safety as a primary reason for searching the
area within a person's reach incident to his or her arrest.49 Weapons
within reach, the Court noted, are as accessible to arrestees as weapons
on their person." The search may also extend beyond the place of arrest
to immediately adjoining areas from which an attack may be launched.5
Searches of vehicles incident to the arrest of an occupant are permitted
to be broader in scope than searches of premises incident to arrest. In
New York v. Belton,52 the Court held that after a lawful arrest of a vehicle
occupant, an officer may search the entire passenger compartment
regardless of whether the area was in the arrestee's immediate control. 3
The Court also allowed the search of any containers within the passenger
compartment so long as the containers were "capable of holding another
object."54 Although it said that it was not deviating from the rule created
in Chimel, the Belton Court did not limit the scope of the search to the
area within reach of the arrestee, as the Chimel decision did in the nonautomobile context. Under Belton, every occupant is presumed to have
access to everything within the car's passenger compartment. 5
44. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
45. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (referring to extent of search
incident to arrest without mentioning need for probable cause beyond that necessary to make arrest).
46. The term "houses," as used in the remainder of this Note, includes any private premises used
for habitation, such as apartments.
47. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
48. See id. at 763.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
52. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
53. See id. at 460.
54. Id. at 460 n.4 (noting that trunk is not included in definition of passenger compartment).
55. See id. at 460.
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In Belton, the Court created a bright-line rule permitting search of the
passenger compartment out of a concern for officer safety and ease of
administration. The Court noted that prior cases regarding vehicle
searches incident to arrest had not delineated an easily administered
rule, 6 and that without a clear rule police and citizens would remain
uncertain of what the U.S. Constitution permitted. 7 Citing Chimel, the
Belton Court also recognized that the search incident to arrest protects

officer safety by permitting officers to remove weapons within reach of
the arrestee 8
Although the Court did not mention the issue of container ownership
in Belton,59 most courts have interpreted Belton to permit the search of all
containers during an automobile search incident to the arrest of an
occupant, regardless of who owns the containers." While the Belton
Court found that the search of containers could be justified by the
decreased expectation of privacy caused by the arrest,6 the Court also
noted that anything within the passenger compartment could be searched
because of the danger the contents of containers might pose to police.62

Because lack of ownership of a container does not prevent access to that
container, placing certain containers off-limits to search because
someone other than the arrestee owns the object seems to contradict the
Court's intention of limiting an arrestee's ability to reach for a weapon.63
A recent U.S. Supreme Court case upheld a search of containers in the

passenger compartment irrespective of ownership when the police had
56. See id. at 458.
57. See id. at 459-60.
58. See id, at 457.
59. See id. at 455-56.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 718 F.2d 332, 334 (9th Cir. 1983) (declaring that if
passenger had left briefcase in car, briefcase would be open to search); People v. Prance, 277 Cal.
Rptr. 567, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); People v. McMillon, 892 P.2d 879, 884 (Colo. 1995); Staten v.
United States, 562 A.2d 90, 92 (D.C. 1989); State v. Moore, 619 So. 2d 376,377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993); State v. Loftis, 568 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also David S. Rudstein,
The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67 Marq. L.
Rev. 205, 238-39 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17,260 (1981). Butsee
State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1993) (holding that search of nonarrested occupant's
jacket violated Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 129-30 (Pa. 1995)
(holding that search of nonarrested passenger's purse violated Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania
Constitution).
61. See Belton,453 U.S. at461.
62. See id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969)).
63. See, e.g., Staten, 562 A.2d at 92 ("Third party ownership of the auto or 'containers' therein
would not necessarily prevent the arrestee from gaining access to those items.").
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probable cause to believe the automobile held evidence of a crime. In
Wyoming v. Houghton,64 the Court upheld the search of a purse owned by
a nonarrested 65 passenger6 6 under the "automobile exigency" exception to
the warrant requirement, which allows police to search an automobile
stopped on the roadway without a warrant if they have probable cause to
believe they will find evidence in the automobile. 67 The automobileexigency exception is based on the idea that the reduced expectation of
69
68
privacy in automobiles on the roadway, combined with their mobility,
permits warrantless searches on probable cause. 7' The automobileexigency exception is different than the search incident to arrest because
the former requires probable cause and the latter does not. Nevertheless,
Houghton provides insight into the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of
searches of containers in vehicles owned by persons other than the
arrestee.
B.

Washington ConstitutionPermits Searches of Vehicles Incident to
Arrest and Protects Certain PrivacyRights of Vehicle Passengers

The Washington Constitution also confines the power of law
enforcement officers to conduct searches and seizures. Washington law
provides greater protection of privacy than the Fourth Amendment from
certain searches and seizures, although its privacy protections are not
uniformly greater than those of the U.S. Constitution. In searches of
automobiles incident to arrest, Washington law closely follows federal
law.
64. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
65. This Note will use the term "nonarrested" rather than "unarrested" to accord with the usage
found in Parker.
66. Houghton, 546 U.S. at 307.
67. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 805, 825 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
68. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569; Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 150-53 (1925).
69. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
70. See id.
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1.

Washington ConstitutionProvides GreaterPrivacyProtectionthan
the FourthAmendment in Certain Contexts

Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides at least as
much protection of privacy as the U.S. Constitution, and it provides that
protection using a similar analytic framework. The application of the

Fourth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause 7' prevents the states from maintaining a lower level
of protection against unreasonable search and seizure than the Fourth
Amendment.72 Like the U.S. Constitution, the Washington Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures73 and requires
warrants for any search unless a warrant exception exists.74 Similar to the

Fourth Amendment, the exceptions to Section 7's warrant requirement
entail balancing privacy interests against law-enforcement interests.75
While federal courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect
privacy interests even though the amendment does not contain the word
privacy,76 the Washington Constitution expressly uses the word
"private. '7 7 The seminal difference between the provisions is that rather

than protecting a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the Fourth
Amendment does, Section 7 protects those "privacy interests which
citizens [of Washington] have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe
from governmental trespass absent a warrant. ' 78 Commentators generally
deem this definition of privacy to be more expansive than its federal
counterpart because Section 7's protection does not rely on the
expectations of citizens.79

The Washington Constitution's provision provides greater protection
of privacy than the Fourth Amendment in some, but not all, search-and71. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
72. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 817-18, 676 P.2d 419,422 (1984); see also State v.
Coss, 87 Wash. App. 891, 905 n.6, 943 P.2d 1126, 1133 n.6 (1997) (Brown, J., dissenting).
73. See State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (1984).
74. See Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d at 818, 676 P.2d at 422.
75. See State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 500, 987 P.2d 73, 81-82 (1999) (citing State v. Stroud,
106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986)).
76. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,350 (1967).
77. Wash. Const. art. I, § 7.
78. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154.
79. See Daniel J. Clark, Dropping Anchor: Defining a Search in Compliance with Article I,
Section 7 ofthe Washington State Constitution,21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1, 3, 8 (1997); George Nook,
Seizing Opportunity, Searchingfor Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 33233 (1985).
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seizure contexts. In some areas of search-and-seizure law,"0 the
Washington Constitution takes advantage of the federal constitutional
principle permitting states to expand civil liberties protection beyond that
provided by the U.S. Constitution.8 Whether a provision of the
Washington Constitution grants greater rights than the U.S. Constitution
depends on an analysis of the Washington constitutional provision under
State v. Gunwall's six-factor analysis.82 Using this analysis, the Supreme
Court of Washington has decided that Article I, Section 7 does generally
provide an enhanced protection of privacy.83 When courts approach the
question of whether Section 7 provides enhanced protection in a
particular context, they concentrate on preexisting state law, the fourth
Gunwall factor; the other five factors "all lead to the conclusion art. I, §7
provides greater protection to privacy than the Fourth Amendment."8 4
The protections guaranteed by Section 7 need not be uniformly greater
than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution: "A determination that a
given state constitutional provision affords enhanced protection in a
particular context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a
different context."85 Thus, the level of privacy protection provided by
Section 7 may be greater than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.
80. See State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 768 n.4, 958 P.2d 982, 985 n.4 (1998), for examples of
state and federal divergence. See also Hugh D. Spitzer, Which Constitution? Eleven Years of
Gunwall in Washington State, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1187, 1200 tbl.2 (1998).
81. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986); State v. Simpson, 95
Wash. 2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199, 1204 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Massachusetts v.
Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986) (requiring Washington courts to determine
whether Washington Constitution extends broader rights than U.S. Constitution using six factors: (1)
constitutions' text, (2) differences in text, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5)
structural differences, and (6) matters of particular state or local concern).
83. See, e.g., State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d 103, 118-19, 960 P.2d 927, 934 (1998) (holding that
under Section 7 police must inform residents of rights when asking for consent to search house);
State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 575-78, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114-16 (1990) (holding that contents
of trash can near house are protected by Section 7).
84. State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208, 217, 970 P.2d 722, 726 (1999) (citing State v. Young,
135 Wash. 2d 498, 509, 957 P.2d 681, 686-87 (1998); see also Gunvall, 106 Wash. 2d at 65-70,
720 P.2d at 814-17. But see State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 446, 909 P.2d 293, 302 (1996)
(noting that, in addition to fourth Gunwall factor, court should examine sixth Gunvall factor:
"whether the matters at issue are of particular state interest or local concern").
85. State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 58, 882 P.2d 747, 770 (1994).
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2.

Supreme Court of Washington Recognized that Search of Vehicles
Incident to Arrest of OccupantProvidefor Safe andEfficient Law
Enforcement

Before its decision in Parker, the Supreme Court of Washington
created an exception to permit warrantless searches of automobiles
incident to arrest, largely following the exception established in Belton.
In State v. Stroud,8 6 the court held that officers could search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the arrest of the driver87
except for locked containers found inside.8" Overruling an earlier
Washington case,89 the Stroud court rejected the requirement for police
officers to have probable cause to believe a search would uncover a
weapon or evidence of crime.9" The court reasoned that asking law
enforcement officers to conduct a case-by-case analysis of what can and
cannot be searched during a search incident to arrest would inhibit
effective law enforcement. 9' Citing Belton, the court said that a clear line
should be drawn to "aid police enforcement."'9 2 The court also noted that,
as in Belton, the threat to officer safety presented an exigency to be
considered in determining the boundaries of the search incident to
arrest.93 The court recognized the exception for locked containers not
only because passengers had demonstrated a heightened expectation of
privacy in the locked container but because a lock would limit access to
weapons in containers.94
Cases following Stroud upheld the balance it struck between privacy
interests and the need for efficient and safe law enforcement.95 The
Supreme Court of Washington has held that a purse owned by an arrested
vehicle passenger could be searched pursuant to the arrest even though
86. 106 Wash. 2d 144,720 P.2d 436 (1986).
87. Automobiles may be searched incident to the arrest of a passenger, not just a driver. See State
v. Cass, 62 Wash. App. 793, 794, 816 P.2d 57,58 (1991).
88. See Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
89. See State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
90. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 150-51, 720 P.2d at 440-41.
91. See id. at 152,720 P.2d at 441.
92. Id. at 151, 720 P.2d at 440.
93. See id.
94. See id,at 152,720 P.2d at 441.
95. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 79 Wash. App. 355, 360-62, 901 P.2d 1094, 1097-98 (1995); State
v. Cass, 62 Wash. App. 793, 796-97, 816 P.2d 57, 59 (1991).
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the privacy interest in the purse might be high.96 In State v. Johnson,97 the
court determined that the reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles
supports the broad search permitted under Stroud: "Vehicles traveling on
public highways are subject to broad regulations not applicable to fixed
residences. This broad regulation does not afford [a car occupant] the
same heightened privacy protection . . .that he would have in a fixed
residence or home. 98 The Supreme Court of Washington has upheld the
rule announced in Stroud, finding support for the rule in vehicle
occupants' low expectation of privacy.
3.

The Washington Constitution'sProtection of Privacy of
NonarrestedPersonsDuring Searches Depends on Where and If an
Arrest Takes Place

Where no vehicle occupant is arrested, the extent of the intrusion on
the privacy of vehicle occupants is limited by Section 7. When police
stop a car for a traffic violation, they may not order a passenger whom
they do not suspect of being dangerous into or out of the automobile. 9
Nor can police ask vehicle occupants for identification when police
approach a vehicle for a parking violation without reasonable suspicion
that the passengers are engaged or have engaged in criminal conduct."
Section 7 also prohibits random stops of automobiles to check the
sobriety of drivers.'
Officers may, in certain circumstances, conduct a limited search for
weapons without arresting any occupant if they have a reasonable
suspicion that an occupant might be armed or dangerous. In State v.
Kennedy, 0 2 the Supreme Court of Washington held that when an officer
has a reasonable suspicion that the occupants are armed, the officer can
96. See State v. Fladebo, 113 Wash. 2d 388, 395, 779 P.2d 707, 711-12 (1989).
97. 128 Wash. 2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (holding sleeper compartment of tractor-trailer rig
subject to search incident to arrest ofoccupant).
98. Id. at 449, 909 P.2d at 303; see also, e.g., State v. Cantrell, 124 Wash. 2d 183, 190, 875 P.2d
1208, 1211-1212 (1994); State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 185 n.2, 867 P.2d 593, 599 n.2 (1994)
("[I]n examining our state constitution's explicit protection of the home the fact the search occurs at
a home is central to the analysis.").
99. See State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722, 728 (1999).
100. See State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642-43, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1982).
101. See Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 458, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988).
102. 107 Wash. 2d 1,726 P.2d 445 (1986).
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search the area within the immediate control of a driver and passenger."
The court allowed the search to encompass the area within the
companion's control because a companion of the suspect "presents a
similar danger to the approaching officer."'"
During house searches, which are analogous but not identical to
vehicle searches, Section 7 protects persons from being searched if they
are not independently suspected of criminal activity." 5 Under
Washington law, a thorough search of such a person's personal effects
tantamount to a search of the person. In State v. Worth, 106 police made
two searches of the defendant's purse, which was resting on a chair
where she sat during a warranted search of a house. The first search was
for weapons; the second was a more probing search that revealed
drugs. 7 Holding the second search unconstitutional, the Washington
Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant's purse deserved the same
privacy protections as her person because her purse was a personal effect
under her control that she sought to preserve as private.' In sum, under
Washington law, persons arrested in premises have greater privacy
protections than vehicle occupants.
II.

IN STATE v. PARKER, THE PLURALITY DECLARED THAT
POLICE MAY NOT SEARCH CONTAINERS OWNED BY
NONARRESTED INDIVIDUALS DURING A SEARCH OF A
VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST

The three cases consolidated in State v. Parker"° each involved the
arrest of the driver of an automobile, the search of personal effects
owned by a nonarrested passenger of the automobile, and a seizure of
drugs contained in those personal effects. In reversing the denials of
motions to suppress, the plurality stated that the police may not legally
103. See id. at 12, 726 P.2d at 452.
104. Id.
105. See State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 302, 654 P.2d 96, 104 (1982).
106. 37 Wash. App. 889, 683 P.2d 622 (1984).
107. See id. at 891, 683 P.2d at 623-24.
108. See id. at 893, 683 P.2d at 624-25.
109. 139 Wash. 2d 486,987 P.2d 73 (1999).
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search containers they know or should know are owned by individuals
not arrested.'10
A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In Parker,the Supreme Court of Washington consolidated three cases:
State v. Parker,"' State v. Jines,1l 2 and State v. Hunnel."3 In Parker,
police stopped a speeding car in which Parker was a passenger." 4 An
officer arrested the driver for driving the vehicle with a revoked driver's
license." 5 Before permitting Parker to drive away, the officers asked
Parker to perform a sobriety test because they had seen an open beer can
in the car." 6 During Parker's sobriety test, an officer noticed some cash
lying on a purse in the passenger seat.' After determining that the cash
belonged to the driver, the officers searched the purse and found a bag of
methamphetamine in a two-by-three-inch coin purse."' Charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, Parker moved to suppress
the evidence." 9 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to
deny Parker's motion. 20
In Jines, an Olympia police officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic
1
violation and arrested the driver for driving with a suspended license.' '
Jines, a passenger, left his jacket between the two front seats as he exited
the car after the officer asked to search its interior. 22 During the search
of the car, police found in the jacket two small boxes containing
110. See id. at 487, 987 P.2d at 75. Chief Justice Guy dissented and Justice Dolliver joined him.
See id. Justice Ireland, the ninth justice on the court, did not participate in Parker.See id.
111. 88 Wash. App. 273, 944 P.2d 1081 (1997), rev'd, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999).
112. 89 Wash. App. 1022 (1998) (unpublished opinion), rev'd sub nom. State v. Parker, 139
Wash. 2d 486, 987 P.2d 73 (1999).
113. 89 Wash. App. 638, 949 P.2d 847 (1998), rev'd sub nom. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486,
987 P.2d 73 (1999).
114. See Parker,139 Wash. 2d at 489, 987 P.2d at 76.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 490, 987 P.2d at 76.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 490, 987 P.2d at 76.
120. See id. at 522, 987 P.2d at 92.
121. See id. at 490, 987 P.2d at 76.
122. See id. at 522, 987 P.2d at 93.
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methamphetamine.I" Jines then told the officer that he owned the
jacket.'24 As in Parker,the trial court and the court of appeals both found
the search permissible."z
In the third case, a Kitsap County deputy sheriff pulled over John
Hunnel's car because the officer knew of outstanding warrants for Mr.
Hunnel's arrest.'26 After arresting Mr. Hunnel, the deputy sheriff asked
Mr. Hunnel's wife to exit the car and leave everything inside.'27 The
officer found methamphetamine in a matchbox in a purse that was sitting
on the passenger side floor.'28 The State conceded that the officer knew
the purse belonged to Ms. Hunnel.'29 She was charged with possession of
a controlled substance, and the court of appeals upheld the denial of her
motion to suppress. 3 °
B.

The Parker PluralityFormulateda New Exception to the Search of
a Vehicle Incident to Arrest, and the ConcurringOpinions
ProposedYet OtherRules

In an opinion written by Justice Johnson, the plurality formulated a
new exception to the scope of a search of a vehicle incident to arrest by
protecting any container owned by someone other than the arrested
person.' The plurality ruled that "if an officer knows or should know
the container is a personal effect of a passenger who is not independently
suspected of criminal activity" the police may not search the container.'
The plurality's analysis assumed that searches of individuals'
possessions are searches of their persons.' The plurality determined that
nonarrested vehicle passengers "hold an independent, constitutionally
protected privacy interest."'34 To support the assertion that the
123. See id
124. See id.
125. See id.
at 491, 522-23, 987 P.2d at 77, 93.
126. See id
127. See id at 520, 987 P.2d at 91.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id.at 492, 987 P.2d at 77.
See id.
at 520, 987 P.2d at 91-92.
See id.
at 520-21,987 P.2d at 92.
See id.
at 489, 505, 987 P.2d at 76, 84 (plurality opinion).
Id.
(plurality opinion).

133. See id. at 495-96, 501, 987 P.2d at 78-80 (plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 496, 987 P.2d at 79 (plurality opinion).
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Washington Constitution recognizes a privacy interest for vehicle
passengers, the plurality cited State v. Mendez,'35 State v. Hendrickson,'36
and State v. Mesiani,'37 cases in which the court protected the rights of
vehicle passengers.'38 The plurality deemed vehicle occupants and their
belongings to have a greater degree of privacy protection under the
Washington Constitution than under the U.S. Constitution. This greater
protection requires that vehicle passengers'
belongings remain outside
39
the scope of a search incident to arrest.
The Parker plurality analyzed these cases as searches of persons
associated with, or in proximity to, arrestees. 40 Finding the fact that the
defendants had not been arrested "determinative," the plurality
considered the searches of the defendants' belongings impermissible
searches of their person, rather than permissible searches of objects: 4 '
"personal belongings clearly and closely associated with non-arrested
vehicle occupants [should not be] subject to full blown police searches
merely because some other occupant in the vehicle is arrested."' 42 The
plurality opinion relied upon premise-search cases holding that during
searches of premises such as houses, the police may not search persons
not named in a warrant without having some degree of suspicion of that
person. 4 3 Citing State v. Worth,'" a premise-search case, the plurality
noted that the prohibition on searches of persons not suspected of a crime
extends to their personal effects: "personal effects are protected from
search to the same extent as the person to whom they belong."'
The Parker plurality determined that officers must have a reasonable
suspicion that items owned by nonarrested passengers contain weapons
135. 137 Wash. 2d 208, 220-21, 970 P.2d 722, 728 (1999) (holding police may not order vehicle
passengers into or out of car during routine traffic stop).
136. 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (stating work-release inmates have same
expectation of privacy in vehicle as other citizens).
137. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775, 778 (1988) (holding that random stops of vehicles to
check sobriety of drivers are unconstitutional).
138. See Parker,139 Wash. 2d at 494, 987 P.2d at 79-80 (plurality opinion).
139. See id. at 498-99, 987 P.2d at 80-81 (plurality opinion).
140. See id. at 496, 987 P.2d at 79 (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 497, 987 P.2d at 80 (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 501, 987 P.2d at 81 (plurality opinion).
143. See id. at 497-98, 987 P.2d at 80-8I (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 (1979) and
State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982)) (plurality opinion).
144. 37 Wash. App. 892, 683 P.2d 622 (1984).
145. Parker,139 Wash. 2d at 498-99, 987 P.2d at 80-81 (plurality opinion).
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or evidence to search the containers."4 If a police officer has a reasonable
suspicion that persons other than the arrested occupant are armed or
dangerous, the officer may search that person.'4 7 Parker's plurality
quoted from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, which
created the frisk-for-weapons exception to the warrant requirement, to
support the idea that a search for weapons and a search incident to arrest
are distinct'48 and that a search for weapons in Parker's purse could not
be conducted without reasonable suspicion.'49 The plurality declared that
the rights of nonarrested passengers to be free from search of their
persons should not be compromised by the search of another
passenger.'
Justice Alexander's opinion concurred with the result in Jines and
Hunnell but not Parker.' He agreed with the plurality that ownership of
a container by a nonarrested vehicle occupant should exempt it from
search.5 2 He did not agree, however, with the plurality's use of "should
know" in the formulation of its rule. Claiming the "should know" portion
of the plurality's rule was subjective,' Justice Alexander would have
held that police officers could not search containers that they know
belong to nonarrested occupants."s4 In what seemed to be a departure
from the rule he formulated, Justice Alexander dissented in Parker even
though the officer knew the purse belonged to the passenger. Justice
Alexander would have upheld the search in Parkerbecause the purse was
in the immediate control of the driver.' This opinion distinguished the
fact that access to a container by the arrested person would permit a
search of the container even though the container was owned by a
146. See id. at 505, 987 P.2d at 84 (plurality opinion).
147. See id. at 489, 505, 987 P.2d at 76, 83 (plurality opinion).
148. See iU. at 499-500, 987 P.2d at 81 (plurality opinion) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
25-26 (1968)).
149. See id at 504-05, 987 P.2d at 84 (plurality opinion).

150. See id. at 501,987 P.2d at 82 (plurality opinion).
151. See id at 517, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

152. See id at 518, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
153. See id Objective standards are usually formulated in terms of what a reasonable person
would or should do. See, e.g., Wash. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Jury Instructions, Washington PatternJury

Instructions-Civil § 10.01, at 97 (3d ed. 1989) ("[Negligence] is the doing of some act which a
reasonably careful person would not do .... ").
154. See Parker, 139 Wash. 2d at 517-18, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
155. See id. at 518-19, 987 P.2d at 91 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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nonarrested individual. 56 Justice Alexander's comparatively short
opinion did not discuss Terry searches or premise searches, as the
57
plurality did. 1

In his concurrence, Justice Talmadge indicated that he would have
limited the search of passenger compartments to containers large enough
hold weapons.'58 Justice Talmadge stated that his bright-line rule would
protect officer safety and would ease administration of vehicle searches
incident to arrest."' Because the containers in the three cases-a
matchbox,' 60 a "small black box," '' and a coin purse162--were too small
to contain weapons, Justice Talmadge believed the searches violated the
owners' constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and
63
seizure.
III.

STARE DECISIS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
PLURALITY OPINIONS

Plurality decisions'64 receive treatment different from majority
opinions because the doctrine of stare decisis 65 generally requires a legal
rule to command a majority of a court's members to carry precedential
weight. 66 Courts are often uncertain about how to interpret plurality
156. See id. (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
157. See id. at 517-19, 987 P.2d at 90-91 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
158. See id. at 516-17, 987 P.2d at 90 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
159. See id. at 517, 987 P.2d at 90 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
160. See id.at 492, 987 P.2d at 77 (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 491, 987 P.2d at 76 (plurality opinion).
162. See id. at 490, 987 P.2d at 76 (plurality opinion).
163. See id. at 516, 987 P.2d at 90 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
164. "Plurality decision" refers to decisions where a majority ofjustices agree on an outcome but
a majority does not agree on a justification for the judgment. See John F. Davis & William L.
Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 Duke L.J. 59, 59
(1974). "Lead opinion" refers to the first opinion in the reporter supporting the judgment, and
"plurality opinion" refers to the opinion supporting the judgment that is supported by the greatest
number of justices. See, e.g., Zueger v. Public Hosp. Dist., 57 Wash. App. 584, 589-90, 789 P.2d
326, 329 (1990).
165. Stare decisis is defined as the "[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb [a]
settled point." Black's Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990). See generally James Hardisty,
Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 Ind. L.J. 41 (1979), for a more complete definition.
166. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Modelfor the Interpretationof PluralityDecisions, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 1593, 1594-95 (1992).
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decisions 67 because the outcome of the case can be supported by
multiple legal rules.'68
Washington courts take a restrictive approach in defining the authority
for which plurality decisions stand. Generally, Washington courts rule
that the precedential value of a plurality decision is limited to subsequent
cases with very similar facts169 or to the narrowest ground supporting the
judgment."' 0 The latter method seems to be derived from the opinions of
the U.S. Supreme Court,' though neither that Court 72 nor the Supreme
Court of Washington has precisely defined the meaning of "narrowest
grounds." Two commentators have concluded that under U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, the narrowest ground for an opinion is the one that will
affect the fewest future cases. 73 In Washington, if a plurality opinion is
treated as a majority opinion in subsequent cases, courts may adhere to
the interpretation for the sake of stare decisis despite the lack of a
majority opinion in the original case."
Courts disfavor plurality decisions not only because of their
questionable authority but because of judicial policy concerns. If a rule
cannot command a majority of a court, the rule is unlikely to last or to
form the basis for the development of a body of case law. 7 5 The
confusion over how to treat pluralities can lead to instability and
unpredictability, both of which undermine the judicial function.' 76
167. See id. at 1600-10; see also Linda Novak, Note, The PrecedentialValue of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 756, 761-78 (1980) (explaining various approaches to
divining meaning from plurality decisions).
168. See Hardisty, supranote 165, at 52-57; Kimura, supra note 166, at 1594-95.
169. See State v. Pittman, 59 Wash. App. 825, 832, 801 P.2d 999, 1003 (1990); State v. Coss, 87
Wash. App. 891, 904,943 P.2d 1126, 1132 (1997) (Brown, J., dissenting).
170. See Davidson v. Hensen, 135 Wash. 2d 112, 128, 954 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1998); State v.
Zakel, 61 Wash. App. 805, 808-09, 812 P.2d 512, 514 (1991), aff'd, 119 Wash. 2d 563, 834 P.2d
1046 (1992); State v. McLean, 58 Wash. App. 422,424 n.1, 793 P.2d 459,460 n.l (1990).
171. See, e.g., Zakel, 61 Wash. App at 808, 812 P.2d at 814 (citing Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
172. See Novak, supranote 167, at 763-64.
173. See Kimura, supranote 166, at 1603-04; Novak, supra note 167, at 764.
174. See State v. Boot, 81 Wash. App. 546, 549 n.1, 915 P.2d 592, 593-94 n.1 (1996); State v.
Gonzalez, 77 Wash. App. 479, 486, 891 P.2d 743, 746-47 (1995).
175. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 164, at 66; Novak, supranote 167, at 765.
176. See Fred w. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to
Which It Should Be Applied, 21 Wash. L. Rev. 158, 159 (1946); Davis & Reynolds, supra note 164,
at 66-75.
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IV. THE PARKER PLURALITY'S RULE DEVIATES FROM
WASHINGTON PRECEDENT TO THE DETRIMENT OF SAFE
AND EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT
The balance struck by the plurality in Parker between privacy
interests and law-enforcement interests is not supported by precedent and
will lead to ineffective and unsafe law enforcement in three ways. First,
the plurality failed to define clearly the extent to which the ownership of
an item will prevent the police from searching it and neglects precedent
by basing a search's permissible scope on access to containers, not
ownership. Second, the Parker plurality deviated from precedent by
incorrectly analogizing vehicle searches incident to arrest cases to other
search cases. Third, the Parker plurality's rule endangers officer safety
and confuses courts.
A.

The Parker Plurality'sDetermination of the Characteristicsthat
Exempt an Item from Search Are Confusing and Deviatefrom
Precedent

The Parkerplurality's rule fails to state unambiguously what items in
the passenger compartment may not be searched during a search incident
to arrest. The plurality's rule also fails to achieve the primary goal of the
search incident to arrest, which is the prevention of access to containers
that may hold weapons.
1.

Items to Which the Parker Plurality'sRule Applies Are Difficult to
Discern

The Parker plurality left open the question of whether ownership
alone or ownership combined with proximity to the container should
make a search of the container impermissible. In its conclusion, the
plurality stated that containers "officers know or should know... belong
to nonarrested passengers" may not be searched. 77 The use of the word
"belong" strongly suggests that Justice Johnson contemplated ownership
of containers as the quality making it impermissible to search them.
Earlier in the opinion, however, the plurality emphasized that control
over a container, not ownership, places it off-limits to search. The
citation to State v. Worth, which protected a purse during a search of a
177. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 505, 987 P.2d 73, 84 (1999) (plurality opinion).
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house because the owner of the purse controlled it,'78 indicates that the
plurality considered control the element that determined whether a
container could be legally searched.' 7 9 Thus, the Parkerplurality created
confusion over whether control or ownership makes a container immune
to search.
The confusion between control and ownership of containers is
exacerbated by Justice Johnson's use of terms with different meanings to
describe items in the passenger compartment that may not be searched.
In its penultimate paragraph, the plurality opinion used the term
"container, '' 80 a word that does not connote an item personal or closely
held, to describe those items subject to the plurality's opinion. Elsewhere
in the opinion, however, the plurality used other words and phrases that
do connote control. For example, the plurality described its rule as
protecting from search "personal possessions," "recognizable personal
effects," and "personal belongings clearly associated with nonarrested
individuals."'' Each of these terms, because of the word "personal,"
suggest control over an item. The court's language failed to make clear
distinctions about what can and cannot be searched incident to arrest.
The plurality also failed to clarify whether privacy rights prevent
searches of items owned by any nonarrested individual or only items
owned by nonarrested occupants. In the first paragraph of its opinion, the
plurality stated that personal possessions belonging to "nonarrested
individuals" could not be searched.' The plurality also referred to the
defendants as "individuals who were not under arrest." ' 3 Using the word
"individuals" seems to indicate that the possessions of non-occupantspossessions of persons not in the vehicle at the time of arrest-may not
be searched. In other parts of the opinion, the plurality used the term
"nonarrested occupants" to refer to those persons whose possessions
cannot be searched."s When the plurality used the word "occupant" it
appeared to suggest that only the possessions of persons in the car at the
time of arrest are off-limits to search. Thus, the plurality failed to clarify
to whom the search rule applies: those who are not in the car at the time
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See 37 Wash. App. 889, 893, 683 P.2d 622, 624 (1984).
See Parker,139 Wash. 2d at 498, 683 P.2d at 80.
Id.
Id. at 489, 505, 987 P.2d at 76, 84 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 489, 987 P.2d at 76 (plurality opinion).

183. Id.
184. Id. at 505, 987 P.2d at 84 (plurality opinion).
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of arrest but have items in the car, or only those who are in the car at the
time of the arrest.
Justice Alexander's opinion contributes to the confusion over the role
of ownership in Parker. This confusion is vexing because Justice
Alexander's opinion failed to clarify the relationship between his opinion
and the majority, a clarification that could have produced a sounder
holding. 185 Despite agreeing with the plurality that containers owned by
nonarrested passengers may not be searched, 186 Justice Alexander
apparently believed that because Parker's purse was within the reach of
the driver, it could be searched incident to arrest. 87 Thus, Justice
Alexander's position seems to contradict his assertion that police officers
may not search a container they know is owned by a nonarrested
passenger. Justice Alexander's application of his rule calls into question
the rule itself, which contributes to the opinion's confusion.
2.

The Parker PluralityFailedto Realize that PrecedentCallsfor
Determiningthe Scope of a Search Based on Access

The plurality deviated from Washington precedent when it
differentiated between containers based on ownership or control, rather
than access. The search incident to arrest has always aimed to limit
access to all weapons within the reach of the arrestee, not just those
owned by the arrestee.' 88 Following the U.S. Supreme Court's rule in
New York v. Belton, 89 Stroud and subsequent Washington cases declared
that prevention of access to weapons is one of the primary reasons for the
search incident to arrest.' 90 By prohibiting searches of locked containers,
Stroud placed off-limits to search only those objects to which access was
already limited, hence minimizing "the danger that the individual either
could destroy or hide evidence located within the container ....
Thus, any rule attempting to exempt certain objects in the passenger
185. See infra section IV.C.2.b.
186. See Parker,139 Wash.2d at 505, 987 P.2d at 84 (plurality opinion).
187. See id. at 518-19, 987 P.2d at 91 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
188. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
189. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
190. See State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 447, 909 P.2d 293, 302-03 (1996); State v.
Fladebo, 113 Wash. 2d 388, 395, 779 P.2d 707, 711-12 (1989); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144,
152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986).
191. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
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compartment from search must account for the accessibility of the
contents of the container rather than ownership of the container.
B.

The Parker Plurality'sAssessment of the PrivacyProtectionof
NonarrestedVehicle Occupants and TheirBelongings Deviated
from Precedent

The plurality's assertion in Parker that vehicle passengers have a
degree of privacy protection under the Washington Constitution that they
do not have under the U.S. Constitution is not supported by precedent.
Also unsupported by precedent is the plurality's use of premise-search
cases to find a heightened protection of privacy for vehicle occupants.
Because of New York v. Belton 92 and Wyoming v. Houghton,'9 it is
almost certain that the Fourth Amendment would not protect the items in
Parker. The erroneous conclusion regarding the protection offered by
Section 7 rested on the plurality's misleading analogy between searches
of premises and searches of cars, and led the plurality to place Terry
limits on searches incident to arrest.
1.

The Parker PluralityOverstatedthe PrivacyProtectionsAfforded
by the Washington Constitutionto Vehicle Passengers

The Parkerplurality erroneously cited a number of car-search cases to
support its finding that Article I, Section 7 grants vehicle passengers
certain privacy protections they do not have under the U.S. Constitution.
The Parkerplurality wrongly implied that State v. Hendrickson' stands
for the proposition that Section 7 grants more privacy protection than the
Fourth Amendment.9 5 In Hendrickson, the police conducted a
19 6
warrantless inventory search of a car owned by a work-release inmate.
Hendrickson did not purport to state a general rule regarding vehicles.
The case only said a work-release inmate's subjective expectation of
privacy, even if lower than another citizen's, cannot form the basis for a
warrantless search or seizure. 97 Hendrickson did not address the issue of
192.
193.
194.
195.

453 U.S. 454 (1981).
526 U.S. 295 (1999).
129 Wash. 2d 61,917 P.2d 563 (1996).
See State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486,495, 987 P.2d 73, 79 (1999) (plurality opinion).
196. 129 Wash. 2d at 67, 917 P.2d at 566.
197. See id. at 71,917 P.2d at 568.
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whether the privacy protection of vehicle passengers is any greater under
the Washington Constitution than it is under the U.S. Constitution. 9 8
Washington cases that do support the finding that vehicle passengers
have a greater protection of privacy under the Section 7 than under
Fourth Amendment did not involve arrests. In one such case cited by the
plurality, State v. Mendez,' 9 the Supreme Court of Washington held that
officers may not order vehicle passengers into or out of vehicles during
traffic stops unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a passenger
is armed or dangerous. 0 0 The Parker plurality used this case to assert
that vehicle passengers have greater protection under Section 7 than
under the Fourth Amendment.2 ' The Parker plurality was mistaken
when it analogized Mendez to Parker because arrests present greater
dangers than situations where no one is arrested. In State v. Kennedy," 2 a
case involving a Terry frisk of a passenger compartment, the court made
clear that nonarrested persons present less danger to officers than
arrested persons: "Because the risk to a Terry suspect is substantially less
than that presented a Stroud arrestee, the risk to the officer is
correspondingly reduced."2 3 Thus, the concern for officer safety in arrest
situations limits Mendez's finding of heightened constitutional protection
to non-arrest situations.
2.

The Parker Plurality'sUse of Premise Search Cases to Support a
Findingof HeightenedPrivacyProtection Is Misplaced

The Parker plurality mistakenly relied on a variety of house-search
cases to justify affording a vehicle passenger's belongings a heightened
privacy protection. For instance, the Parker plurality cited State v.
Broadnax,2 4 in which the court upheld a motion to suppress evidence
seized when police frisked a nonarrested person in a house.20 5 However,
Broadnax and other premise-search cases do not support the court's
198. See id.
199. State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208, 212, 970 P.2d 722, 724 (1999).
200. Id. at 212, 970 P.2d at 724; see also State v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775,
778 (1988) (holding invalid random stops of vehicles to check sobriety of drivers).
201. See 139 Wash. 2d at 493-94, 987 P.2d at 78 (plurality opinion).
202. 107 Wash. 2d 1,726 P.2d 445 (1986).
203. Id. at 12, 726 P.2d at 451.
204. 98 Wash. 2d 289, 302, 654 P.2d 96, 104 (1982) (cited in Parker, 139 Wash. 2d at 497-98,
987 P.2d at 78-79 (plurality opinion)).
205. See Parker, 139 Wash. 2d at 497-98, 987 P.2d at 80-81 (plurality opinion).
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reasoning for two reasons. First, the threat to the safety of law
enforcement officers is greater during arrests of vehicle occupants than
during searches of premises.0 6 By employing a different standard that
allows a broader search, Stroud implicitly recognized the greater danger
of roadside encounters." 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized
the heightened risk to safety during roadside encounters.0 8
A second reason premise search cases do not support the Parker
plurality's contention is that the privacy interest in premises is higher
than the privacy interest in vehicles. Washington courts have declared
repeatedly that the privacy and liberty interests of vehicle passengers
may not be as great as those of persons in premises.2°9 For example, in
State v. Johnson, the court upheld the search of a sleeper compartment of
a truck incident to the arrest of the driver, declaring that the person's
privacy interest in the sleeper compartment was not as great as his
privacy interest in a house.210 The Johnson court declined to apply a rule
of search and seizure derived from premise searches to the case.21' Thus,
the conclusion that the Parker plurality drew from its comparison of
searches of persons in premises to searches of persons in vehicles did not
comply with precedent.
3.

The Parker PluralityDeviatedfrom Precedentby PlacingTerry
Limits on Searches Incident to Arrest

By concluding that Section 7 grants vehicle passengers heightened
privacy protection, the Parker plurality incorrectly treated searches of
containers in Parker as Terry searches of a person. Under the plurality's
rule in Parker,police need reasonable suspicion that a container holds a
weapon or evidence to overcome
the new-found heightened privacy
22
protection of vehicle passengers.
206. See infranotes 226-31.
207. See id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 440-41; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)
(recognizing that "roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous");
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48

(1972).
208. See supranotes 37-40 and accompanying text.
209. See supranote 98 and accompanying text.
210. See State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 448-49, 909 P.2d 293, 303-04 (1996).

211. See id at 449, 909 P.2d at 303-04.
212 See State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 505, 987 P.2d 73, 84 (1999) (plurality opinion).
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Under the Fourth Amendment, the containers in Parkerwould almost
certainly be subject to search without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. The U.S. Supreme Court would likely formulate the same rule
for searches of automobiles incident to arrest that it formulated for
automobile-exigency searches in Houghton. Like the search-incident-toarrest exception,
the "car exigency" line of cases out of which
Houghton grew did not make ownership-based distinctions between
containers within a vehicle,2 a distinction the Houghton Court found
persuasive for car-exigency searches.215 Moreover, a search incident to
arrest is conducted to secure weapons as well as evidence, whereas the
probable-cause search is conducted only for evidence and contraband.
The danger that the search incident to arrest is intended to diffuse makes
it even more inadvisable to place greater restrictions on it than on
automobile-exigency searches. 16
The Parker plurality selectively quoted United States v. Robinson 217
and Terry v. Ohio218 to support the assertion that police need reasonable
suspicion to search a container owned by a vehicle occupant who is not
arrested. Parker quoted Robinson to support the idea that a search
incident to arrest "cannot constitutionally derive from the need to secure
officer safety alone."2 '9 Robinson, which held that an officer can search
the person of an arrestee incident to arrest, disavowed the Parker
plurality's approach in the paragraph following the one quoted by
Parker: "Terry, therefore, affords no basis to carry over to a probable
cause arrest the limitations this Court placed on a stop-and-frisk search
permissible without probable cause., 220 Robinson made clear that Terry
searches are different from searches incident to arrest because the latter
require probable cause to arrest rather than reasonable suspicion. Neither
213. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (failing to make any reference
to ownership)
214. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999).
215. See id.
216. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1998); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208,
214 n.2, 970 P.2d 722, 725 n.2 (1999); see also Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 60, at 255
("When the police have arrested an individual.., a failure to search may afford the arrestee an
opportunity to destroy evidence or seize a weapon.") (footnote omitted).
217. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
218. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
219. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 483, 499, 987 P.2d 73, 81 (1999) (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S.
at 227).
220. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 228.
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Belton nor Stroud suggested that Terry limitations should be placed on
searches incident to arrest. In other words, neither required reasonable
suspicion to search anything in the car once an arrest had taken place. In
sum, the Parker plurality was mistaken when it equated the search of
containers incident to arrest to Terry searches of their owners.
C.

Parker Will EndangerOfficers, HinderLaw Enforcement, and
Confuse Lower Courts

The confusion created by the Parker plurality's rule will complicate
police officers' administration of searches. The plurality's ownershipbased rule and its characterization of searches incident to arrest as Terry
searches will threaten the safety of officers. Moreover, Parker's lack of
clarity and multiple opinions will confound lower courts.
1.

The Parker PluralityThreatens the Safety of Officers and Hinders
Effective Law Enforcement

The Supreme Court of Washington, in Stroud, emphasized that the
scope of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest must follow a brightline rule to protect officers. Stroud declared that a totality-of-thecircumstances test asks police to use a complex, multifaceted legal rule
to make a quick, ad hoc decision. 2 ' According to Stroud, complex rules
must be avoided to prevent danger to officers and to "aid police
enforcement. ' '2 2
The rule advanced by the plurality is precisely the sort of complicated
formulation that should be avoided when crafting a search-incident-toarrest rule. The plurality also left unanswered the question of how an
officer should know an item is owned or controlled by a nonarrested
occupant. Satisfied that "it is not overly difficult to determine to whom a
personal effect belongs," the four justices did not specify what factors an
officer might use to determine who owns a container.2 ' Although the
placement and type of container might provide clues to its ownership,
those clues often will not provide a clear answer.2 In addition, officers
221. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 151,720 P.2d 436, 440 (1986).
222. Id.
223. Parker,139 Wash. 2d at 503, 987 P.2d at 83 (plurality opinion).
224. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the difficulty faced by officers in determining the scope
of the search in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305 (1999): "[if the court were to adopt a]
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may or may not be able to rely on the statements of nonarrested
passengers regarding ownership of containers. While the Parker
plurality's test may not present questions any more complex than those
common to police work, such as the determination of probable cause,225
the policy in Stroud favoring clarity suggests that complexities should be
avoided when delineating the extent of a vehicle search incident to arrest.
The difficulty of determining if a personal effect belongs to a
nonarrested occupant could pose difficulties to an officer. For instance,
before initiating a search, an officer may have to hesitate while trying to
determine if a container belonged to a nonarrested occupant; yet, officers
"must make a decision to search with little more than a moment's
reflection." 226 In addition to determining ownership, an officer may have
to confront the confusion the plurality's rule creates over the protection
afforded items owned by nonarrested individuals.2 27 For example,
officers may not know for certain if they can search an item owned by a
nonarrested individual who is not in the car at the time of arrest.
The Parker plurality's rule makes searches of vehicles incident to
arrest less safe to law enforcement officers and more difficult to
administer. Because containers owned or controlled by someone other
than the arrestee may be accessible to the arrestee, the Parkerplurality's
prohibition of searches of those containers threatens officer safety. The
court of appeals recognized as much in Hunnel when it found that "even
a purse under the control of a nonarrested occupant of the car
is... accessible to the arrested occupant for weapons. 228 The Parker
plurality's rule fails to prevent the arrestee's access to weapons because
ownership and control are inapposite when determining accessibility.
Analogizing the search of the items in Parkerto Terry searches poses
a danger to officers because searches incident to arrest are more
'passenger's property' [exception] ...such questions [would arise] as whether the officer should
have believed a passenger's claim of ownership, whether he should have inferred ownership from
various objective factors, whether he had probable cause to believe that the passenger was a
confederate ....
"
225. See Parker, 139 Wash. 2d at 503, 987 P.2d at 83 (comparing determination of ownership to
determinations of probable cause).
226. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 151, 720 P.2d at 440.
227. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
228. State v. Hunnel, 89 Wash. App. 638, 643, 949 P.2d 847, 850 (1998); see also Staten v.
United States, 562 A.2d 90, 92 (D.C. 1989) ("Third-party ownership of the auto or 'containers'
therein would not necessarily prevent the arrestee from gaining access to those items. It should not,
therefore, bar the police from searching them in the same manner as if they were owned by the
arrestee.").
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dangerous than stop-and-frisk searches. The U.S. Supreme Court has
differentiated between the danger faced by officers during Terry stopand-frisk searches and searches incident to arrest. The Court found that a
stop without a formal arrest, such as Terry, is less dangerous to police:
"Where there is no formal arrest... a person might well be less hostile
to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to
destroy incriminating evidence... ."" Unlike a person stopped pursuant
to Terry, an arrested person is typically taken into custody, and thus will
be in contact with police for a longer period of time, thereby exposing
police to more danger. ° In Robinson, the Court recognized the danger of
an arrest situation,"' regardless of the grounds for arrest.u2 Thus, the
Parker plurality fails to acknowledge the threat to officer safety created
by the analogy to Teny.
2.

Parker DecreasesJudicialEfficiency

In addition to endangering police officers, Parker fails to give
guidance to lower courts. The murkiness of the opinions of the plurality
and Justice Alexander, and the failure of the court to recognize the lack
of a majority opinion, create confusion. The confusion Parker creates
cannot be avoided simply by reading the case narrowly because it is not
clear which of the three opinions supporting the judgment is the
narrowest opinion.
a.

The Parker Plurality'sOpinion Will Confuse Lower Courts

Parker's plurality decision is likely to create uncertainty and
confusion among lower courts. The plurality's confusing references to
control and ownership, and the issue of whether an officer should know
that a container is owned by someone other than an arrestee could lead to
many appeals and greater uncertainty in the area of searches incident to
arrest. 3 Given the plurality opinion's lack of clarity, lower courts will
229. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,296 (1973).
230. See Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973); see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 11617(1998).
23 1. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
232. See id.at 234 n.5.
233. See supranotes 177-88 and accompanying text.
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likely create confusing or contradictory rulings regarding the scope of the
search, which will only add to the difficulty of performing searches.
The most confusing aspect of Parkeris the court's failure to formulate
a rule in a majority opinion. The concurring opinions of Justices
Talmadge and Alexander cannot be construed to support fully the
plurality's rule. Justice Talmadge limited the search of containers to
those that could hold weapons; he did not differentiate between
containers based on ownership or control,"' as the plurality did. Justice
Alexander's excision of "should know" from the plurality's rule is a
major departure from the plurality because his rule appears to be
subjective, despite his intentions to the contrary.235 A search that depends
on the actual knowledge of an officer, and not objective facts, is
subjective.236 The plurality, on the other hand, would also have
prohibited searches of containers that an officer did not know but should
have known were owned by nonarrested occupants, a subjective and
objective standard.
Adding to the uncertainty of the meaning of the case, the court did not
appear to have realized that no opinion commands a majority of justices.
The plurality repeatedly referred to its opinion as a statement of the
holding, when it had no authority to announce one. 7 Justice
Talmadge,23 8 Justice Alexander,239 Chief Justice Guy, and Justice
Dolliver2 40 compounded the problem when they called the plurality
opinion a majority opinion. Lower courts have also failed to notice that
Parkerhas no majority.24 ' Their failure to recognize Parker as an opinion
234. See State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 516-17, 987 P.2d 73, 90 (1999) (Talmadge, J.,
concurring).
235. Id. at 518, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[T]he
majority opinion injects a subjective standard that runs counter to the rationale we set forth in
Stroud.").

236. See supra note 153.
237. See Parker,139 Wash. 2d at 489, 987 P.2d at 76 (plurality opinion); see also supra Part.III.
238. See id. at 505, 987 P.2d at 84 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
239. See id. at 517, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
240. See id. at 519, 987 P.2d at 91 (Guy, C.J., dissenting).
241. See, e.g., State v. Porter; No. 24304-1-I1, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1622, at *6 n.3 (Wash.
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2000); State v. Olson, No. 24218-4-I, (consolidated), No. 24247-8-II, 2000 Wash.
App. LEXIS 726, at *11 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2000) (stating that Parker'sholding was plurality's
"know or should know" rule); State v. Taylor, No. 24152-8-II, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 727, at *8
(Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2000); State v. Harsila, No. 23918-3-II, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 561, at *5,
*6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2000) (declaring that Parker stood for plurality's "know or should
know" rule).
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devoid of a majority is important because plurality opinions do not carry
the same precedential weight as majority opinions; plurality opinions
should not be accorded the same recognition as majority opinions.242
b.

Lower CourtsMust Decide the Narrowest Grounds on Which
Parker Rests

If lower courts realize, as they should, that the Parkerplurality is not a
majority, they will have the difficult task of discerning which of the
243
concurring opinions is the narrowest ground on which Parker rests.
Justice Alexander's opinion probably represents Parker's narrowest
opinion supporting the judgment. His opinion is narrower than the
plurality because it limits searches to those items officers know are
owned by nonarrested passengers, rather than those they should know are
owned by nonarrested passengers. 2' His opinion may also affect fewer
cases than Justice Talmadge's opinion because Justice Talmadge's rule
would affect every search incident to arrest, even those where all
passengers are arrested.245
It is not certain, however, that Justice Alexander's opinion should be
considered Parker's holding. The conclusion that Justice Alexander's
opinion is the narrowest is thrown into doubt by his application of his
rule, in which he implied that the proximity of a container to an arrestee
would make the container open to search, regardless of the container's
ownership.246 Justice Alexander's characterization of the "should know"
test as subjective also casts doubt on the meaning of his rule because it is
contrary to the widely accepted definition of subjective.247 Finally, it is
uncertain that Justice Alexander's rule would arise any less frequently
than Justice Talmadge's, even though Justice Talmadge's rule would
apply to all searches incident to arrest. In sum, the precise rule of Parker
is in serious doubt.
242. See supraPartIl.
243. See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supranote 164, at 66-75.
244. See Parker, 139 Wash. 2d at 517-18, 987 P.2d at 90 (Alexander, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).

245. See id. at 517, 987 P.2d at 90 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
246. See id. at 518-19, 987 P.2d at 91 (Alexander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
247. See supranotes 153,235.
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CONCLUSION

The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution is the result of a careful weighing of the interest in law
enforcement against the interest in privacy. By ignoring precedent, the
Parker plurality upsets the balance the Supreme Court of Washington
had struck between those competing concerns. Although the plurality
pursued the laudable goal of strengthening civil liberties, it did so
without a basis in case law and at the expense of safe and efficient law
enforcement. The court's ambiguous explanation of its proposed
holdings and its inability to articulate a genuine holding will frustrate law
enforcement by police and by the courts; its failure to distinguish
between access and ownership, and between Terry searches and searches
incident to arrest, will endanger officers. To cure these deficiencies, the
court should adopt a rule that provides for searches of vehicles incident
to arrest that do distinguish between objects based on ownership, and that
do not require reasonable suspicion to search objects within a car. The
court should adopt such a rule that commands the support of a majority
of justices to avoid police and judicial inefficiencies and protects the
safety of law enforcement officers.
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